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Abstract
In 2003, the Kimberley Process, a public-private partnership gathering governments, the 
diamond industry and several civil society organizations, entered into force. This 
international scheme, aiming at fighting against conflict diamonds, imposed export bans 
on diamonds from the Marange Fields in the Eastern part of Zimbabwe and from the 
Central African Republic. Indeed, evidence of violations of the minimum requirements 
of the Kimberley Process were found in the two countries, due to their fragile political 
situation. By sending targeted sanctions against conflict diamonds, the Kimberley 
Process acted as a conflict resolution body, which makes these sanctions the first 
partially imposed by the private sector. In order to measure the effectiveness of the 
sanctions, a two-level approach was used, first focusing on whether the sanctions 
attained the political objectives of the sanction, and then on assessing whether the 
enforcement of the sanction impaired the achievement of the objectives. I found that the 
two sanctions targeted on conflict diamonds from the Marange Fields and from the 
Central African Republic failed on both levels of analysis. The study points out that the 
Kimberley Process has neither the capacity nor the ability to resolve conflict 
autonomously.
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1     Introduction
The 1990s are famously known as the sanctions decade for the United Nations 
(Cortright, Lopez, 2000). After the end of the Cold War and the easing of East-West 
tensions, the consensus needed among the five permanent members of the Security 
Council to pass a resolution was reached more easily. Consequently, the UN was 
allowed to intervene more agressively in international affairs (Wallensteen, Staibano, 
2005, p.3). Indeed, between 1990 and 2003, the UN imposed as many as fourteen 
economic sanctions, whilst between 1945 and 1990, only two were imposed – against 
Rhodesia and South Africa (Brzoska, 2003, p.519).
However, economic sanctions imposed in the 1990s, in particular those imposed on 
Iraq, Yugoslavia and Haiti, were criticized by a number of scholars, humanitarian 
organisations, as well as UN member governments, who denounced their desastrous 
humanitarian impact (Doxey 1971, Cortright and Lopez 2002, Brzoska 2003). For 
instance, in Iraq, the population suffered while the targeted elite close to Saddam 
Hussein was left unscathed (Brzoska, 2003, p.520). 
As the ethics of comprehensive sanctions were put into question, scholars found a 
new way to destabilize some key targeted individuals without harming the population : 
the 'smart' or 'targeted' sanctions were created1 (Drezner 2011, p.98). Targeted sanctions 
are « directed against significant national decision-makers (political leaders and key 
supporters of a particular regimes) and resources that are essential for their rule » 
(Wallensteen, Staibano, Eriksson, 2003, background). 
In December 1998, Global Witness, a British NGO specialized in the fight against 
the plundering of natural ressources in developing countries, published a report 
describing how diamonds fuelled the civil war in Angola (Global Witness, 1999). 
Indeed, diamond trade was used by the rebel group UNITA to fund hostilities targeted 
against the Angolan government. The UN reacted by imposing a sanction targeted on 
rough diamonds from UNITA from 1998 to 2002. In addition, the UN mandated bans on 
1 In this study, the term 'targeted' will be prefered to 'smart' sanction. 
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the trade of diamonds from Sierra Leone and Liberia which also financed civil wars. 
The diamond industry decided to take part in the banning of illegal mining and trade 
of conflict diamonds (Sethi, Emelianova, 2011, p.213). In 2003, the Kimberley Process 
(KP), a public-private partnership together gathering 81 governments, the diamond 
industry and several civil society organizations, such as Partnership Africa Canada 
(PAC), entered into force. Through an international certification scheme, the KP aims at 
preventing conflict diamonds from entering the international market, and thus at 
preventing conflicts (KP 1). 
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), the core document of the KP, 
imposes a certain number of requirements on its participants before allowing them to 
certify that their sales of rough diamonds are 'conflict-free', inter alia implementing 
legislation and national institutions, as well as controls of export, import and domestic 
trade of diamonds. They must also commit to transparency of activities related to 
diamonds and to conducting statistical data exchanges. Furthermore, international 
shipments of rough diamonds must be accompanied by a certificate guaranteeing they 
are not used to finance armed conflict. More importantly, participants must trade only 
with each other2 (KP 2a). Any participant violating these minimum requirements would 
be expelled from the scheme. 
However, the Central African Republic and Zimbabwe were judged non-compliant 
with the KP standards. In effect, from 2009 to 2011, the KP banned the exports of 
diamonds from the Marange Fields, located in the Eastern part of Zimbabwe. Indeed, 
amongst other things, the government perpetuated human rights abuses on illegal 
miners. Similarly, the CAR has been expelled from the KP since May 2013 and is still 
suspended today. Indeed, the civil war that initiated the KP decision of suspending the 
CAR from the KP continues. The decision was taken because the rebel groups operating 
in the CAR appeared to finance their activities through the illicit sale of rough 
diamonds. But is it not paradoxical that the KP suspended the CAR because rebels 
groups sold diamonds illegaly? If the CAR is not allowed to sell any diamonds, would it 
not reinforce the illegal diamond trade? Have the embargoes stopped the conflicts ? 
These are some questions I intend to clear up in this study. 
2 The requirements for participation are outlined in Sections II, V (a) and VI (8,9) of the KPCS (KP 2). 
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1.1 Purpose and research question
I will use the export bans on raw diamonds from the CAR and the Marange Fields 
imposed by the KP to conduct a case study, as I seek to investigate the effectiveness of 
sanctions targeted on diamonds imposed by this public-private partnership (PPP). These 
sanctions were imposed autonomously by the KP, i.e. non-mandated by the UN, which 
makes them exceptional since they are the only ones imposed by a PPP and thus the 
only ones partially imposed by the private sector (Wallensteen, Stainbano & Eriksson, 
2003). 
 Scholars have measured the effectiveness of targeted sanctions imposed by the UN 
(Cortrights & Lopez 2002), as well as by new actors operating targeted sanctions such 
as the EU (De Vries & Hazelzet 2005) but there is no research aimed at measuring the 
effectiveness of the private sector as a sanction sender. My thesis contributes to the 
accumulated research by focusing on the effectiveness of the only case of a public-
private body imposing a targeted sanction. 
 This research is also a contribution to research on the private sector's role in conflict. 
By sending sanctions, the KP has become the first partially private entity to incorporate 
conflict resolution in its activities. Therefore, by measuring the effectiveness of the 
targeted sanctions against conflict diamonds from the CAR and the Marange Fields, I 
intend to assess the effectiveness of the KP as an autonomous conflict resolver body.  
My research question is thus:
How effective are the sanctions targeted on diamonds from the Marange fields and the 
CAR imposed by the Kimberley Process?
3
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1.2 Hypothesis
The KP has an interesting composition since it is a coalition between governments, the 
diamond industry and civil society organisations. At first glance, these actors seem to 
have antagonistic interests. Indeed, the diamond industry's trade issues seem 
inescapably inconsistent with the humanitarian aspirations of the CSOs. 
However, given the notion of corporate responsibility3 which emerged 
concomitantly with the creation of the KP, I suppose that the diamond industry has a 
strong interest in guaranteeing that the diamonds it sells are conflict-free. Finally, I 
presume that since the diamond industry and NGOs specialized in the link between 
natural resource and conflicts and human rights abuses are part of the tripartite 
composition of the KP, the latter has a considerable asset in regard to expertise – the 
industry being an expert in the diamond trade and the NGOs in problems arising from 
the diamond trade. The KP seems to encompass a well-balanced composition and thus 
provide prima facie evidence that the KP is an expert in the field of conflict diamonds 
and human rights. Therefore, I suppose that the KP sanctions targeted on diamonds from 
the Marange Fields and the CAR have been effective. 
1.3    Theory
Scholars have used different methods to measure the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions. This is due to the fact that there is no consensual definition of an effective 
sanction. Therefore, evaluating the effectiveness of targeted sanction is difficult on a 
conceptual, methodological and analytical level (Biersteker 2009, p.8). Most of the 
theories aiming at measuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions have focused on 
comprehensive sanctions.
The theory which I chose to use for measuring the effectiveness of the KP targeted 
sanctions is the most relevant for measuring the effectiveness of targeted sanctions. This
3 See part 3.1.1 for more details on corporate responsibility
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theory was developed by Jan Grebe, in an article where he discusses the effectiveness of 
UN and EU targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe. He used a two-level approach to 
measure targeted sanction effectiveness (Grebe, 2010, p.10). 
The first level deals with the political objectives. The latter are specific to each 
sanction and formulated in the official documents which impose the sanctions (Ibid.). 
Establishing human rights, democratization, regime change are all examples of political 
objectives. In order to assess the success of the primary objectives, I need to examine 
whether the objectives set in the official documents of the KP starting the enforcement 
of the sanctions on the Central African and the Marange Fields conflict diamonds have 
been attained.
The second level measures the result of the sanctions and the potential influence of 
the sanction on the attainment of the primary objectives (Ibid, p.11). In other words, in 
order to measure the second level of effectiveness, I need to conduct an empirical 
analysis in order to determine whether sanctions have been successfully implemented. 
Thanks to this two-level approach, a sanction can be qualified as successful on one level 
and unsuccesful on the other one.
1.4 Method
This research is a type of qualitative case study where two countries will be studied in 
depth: the CAR and Zimbabwe. I will use Jan Grebe's theory of sanction effectiveness 
in order to measure the effectiveness of the KP sanctions imposed on the diamonds from 
the CAR and Zimbabwe. It is a disciplined-configurative study since it uses an 
established theory to explain two cases (George, Bennett 2005, p.213). 
A usual criticism made towards case studies as a method is that it is not possible to 
draw any generalizing conclusions (Lundquist, 1993, p.105). However, this study is not 
aimed at making any generalization about how other PPPs would behave in the event 
that they imposed a targeted sanction to a country in conflict, but rather about how they 
could behave. The research area of targeted sanction is relatively new, and as stated 
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above, no research has been conducted on the effectiveness of the KP as a conflict 
resolver and I regard this essay as a contribution to the scientific discussion.
Since this is a case study, the choice of cases is important. Teorell and Svensson have 
outlined four important principles for chosing cases: to chose relevant, generalizable, 
variable cases, and to aim at complementing extensive results (Teorell & Svensson, 
2007, p.222).  
Zimbabwe and the CAR are not the only countries failing to meet the basic 
requirements asked of diamond producing nations by the Kimberley Process. A lack of 
political will and weak internal controls in the Republic of the Congo (ROC) led to its 
expulsion from 2004 to 2007. Indeed, the ROC was expelled because it could not prove 
the origin of the diamonds it sold – most of them are believed to originate from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). However, the suspension of the ROC is not 
relevant for my study since I focus solely on sanctions imposed by the KP on countries 
in conflict situation. On the other hand, the case of Côte d'Ivoire, whose diamonds were 
used to financel rebel groups is neither relevant for my study since the export ban on 
diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire was mandated by the UNSC. 
Therefore, in order to assess the effectiveness of the KP as a conflict-resolver, I had 
to analyze the only two cases relevant for my research: the sanctions targeted on 
diamonds from the Marange Fields and from the CAR.  
1.5 Material 
This study is primarily based on second-hand sources, such as books and articles written 
by scholars on the research context of the study, namely targeted sanctions. 
 When I searched for literature on economic sanctions, I first used the book of David 
Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, a key reference in sanction theory and Johan Galtung's 
article stated above, which was the seminal work regarding the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions. However, these authors' works were not appropriate for my subject 
because they focused on comprehensive sanctions. Therefore, I turned to more targeted 
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sanction-specific scholars, such as Cortright and Lopez, Grebe, and Brzoska. In 
addition, I mainly used the publications of the principal research institutes on targeted 
sanctions – the Interlaaken Process, the Bonn-Berlin Process and above all the 
Stockholm Process, conducted by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of 
Uppsala University.
In order to conduct my case study on the CAR and the Marange Fields in 
Zimbabwe, I have used NGO reports, such as those published by Human Rights Watch, 
Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada in order to assess the situations before 
and after the sanctions. Finally, my study is largely based on the KP's publications, 
reports and Administrative Decisions. 
1.6 Disposition
The study starts by presenting the research context of the study, i.e. targeted sanctions – 
and more specifically targeted commodity sanctions. The practical difficulties of 
enforcing a sanction targeted on diamonds are explained. We will then see whether the 
UN successfully managed to counter these difficulties by briefly analyzing the 
effectiveness of the UN sanctions against conflict diamonds. In order to understand how 
the KP functions, I will in a third part, describe the mechanisms and the design of the 
KP. Based on the literature on businesses in global governance, the role of the KP in 
conflict situation will be explained. Then, the background context to the conflicts in the 
Marange Fields and the CAR, as well as the sanctions' goals are presented. Finally, the 
study proposes an analysis of the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the KP, and 
thereby its ability of being an autonomous conflict resolving body.
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2 The research context of the study
2.1   Targeted sanctions
2.1.1   From comprehensive to targeted sanctions
As we have seen in the introduction, comprehensive sanctions were strongly criticized 
by political circles, diplomats, scholars and humanitarian groups. The most prominent 
area of concern identified with comprehensive sanctions was the humanitarian 
consequences they involved. Indeed, comprehensive sanctions proved to impose severe 
humanitarian costs to the population. This is what Eyler calls the 'cruel paradox' of 
comprehensive sanctions (Eyler, 2007, p.73). 
The discussion on how sanction senders should take into consideration both the 
economic and the humanitarian costs of their sanction began with Doxey in 1971 (Eyler 
2007, p.74). However, the most prominent scholars in this field arrived later, in 
particular with the work of Cortright and Lopez, who dedicated a chapter to targeted 
sanctions in their book (Cortright, Lopez, 2002). Since then, targeted sanctions have 
been studied by a certain number of scholars (Brzoska 2003; Drezner 2003 ; Risa 
Brooks 2002 ; Clara Portela 2008 ; Elliott 2005). 
Around fifteen years ago, targeted sanctions became the subject of several research 
institutes. Indeed, the Swiss, the German and the Swedish governments launched 
research programs in the framework of an international process dealing with targeted 
sanctions. This was first launched by Switzerland, focusing on financial sanctions with 
the Interlaken Process. Thereafter, Germany initiated the Bonn-Berlin Process which put 
the focus on arms embargoes, aviation sanctions and travel bans. Finally, the Swedish 
government started a research program at the department of Peace and Conflict 
Reasearch at Uppsala University, the Stockholm Process. The latter focused primarily 
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on the implementation of targeted sanctions imposed by the UN (Wallensteen, Staibano, 
Eriksson, 2003). 
2.1.2 How are targeted sanctions supposed to work?
By definition, targeted sanctions are discriminating and focus on a target and its 
activities, not on the entire population of a country (Biersteker, 2009, p.3). In order to do 
so, the sanction senders have to find the sanction that is best suited to the situation of the 
receiving country. There are several types of targeted sanctions, such as targeted 
financial sanctions against individuals and entities, travel bans against individuals, arms 
embargoes or commodity bans, on which we will focus in the next part (Ibid.). 
Therefore, targeted sanctions need to be flexible and to fit to the situation of the 
targeted country. Since they are more complex to administer and to implement than 
comprehensive sanctions, targeted sanctions may require greater political will to be 
effective (Ibid., p.4). Indeed, groups of experts need to study the situation in the 
receiving country to find the most suited sanction, in order to make the sanction as 
effective as possible. 
As we have seen, targeted sanctions are designed to hurt elite supporters of the 
targeted regime while imposing minimal hardship on the mass public (Drezner, 2011, 
p.96). However, it is important to note that targeted sanctions also have some inevitable 
humanitarian consequences, both for the targets and for the population (Biersteker, 
2009, p.4). Targeted sanctions are effectively aimed at avoiding the 'cruel paradox' of 
comprehensive sanctions but we have to keep in mind that all economic sanctions have 
negative consequences, including humanitarian consequences. 
Targeted sanctions have three purposes: to coerce, to constrain and to signal (Ibid., 
p. 4-5). If the goal is to make the target do something, the sanction aims at coercing. On 
the other hand, the sanction's purpose is to constrain if the goal is to prevent the target 
from doing something. Finally, the sanction aims at signaling if the goal is to send a 
signal or a message to an external audience.
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 2.2   Targeted commodity sanctions 
Targeted trade sanctions aim at reducing revenues and at controlling flows of strategic 
commodities going to particular actors (Wallensteen, Staibano, Eriksson, 2003, p.123). 
These import or export bans, concern most of the time exports of particular 
commodities such as tobacco, timber, oil and rough diamonds (Ibid.). Trade sanctions 
targeted at particular commodities are not new. Nowadays, however, they are aimed at 
ensuring that they do not finance parties deemed to be illegitimate, and particularly of 
those engaged in armed conflict (House of Lords, 2007, p.28). Theoretically, 
commoditiy sanctions can be applied to an entire country but handicap only the actor 
most benefiting from that commodity (Le Billion, Nicholls, 2007, p.616). Thereby, they 
should avoid some of the classic problems of comprehensive sanctions as they are not 
intended to harm the entire economy (Wallensteen, Staibano, Eriksson, 2003 p.123).
2.2.1   Problems in the implementation of sanctions targeted on diamonds
In practice, however, commodity sanctions are difficult to implement. The 
Stockholm Process identified the typical problems encountered when enforcing a 
targeted commodity sanction:
1. Goods that are subject to targeted trade sanctions such as oil, diamonds or 
timber are frequently difficult or impossible to distinguish from similar 
goods that are not subject to such sanctions. 
2. The control of these commodities can be evaded by mixing banned goods 
with those that are allowed to be freely traded. 
3. Certification systems for targeted goods are not internationally stan- 
dardized or may not be used in practice (e.g. end-use certificates for arms 
purchases or rough diamonds). The use of false documents creates 
opportunities for sanctions evasion. 
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4. Commodities, such as oil, that might be included in targeted sanctions 
regimes generate their own problems. Oil companies and governments may 
not monitor fuel stocks and movements in areas adjacent to conflict zones. 
5. Targeted actors may shift from trading in one sanctioned commodity to 
other non-sanctioned resources (e.g. from rough to polished diamonds, from 
diamonds to timber). 
6. Targeted actors subject to import bans will frequently stockpile the goods 
in question prior to implementation of sanctions.
7. Targeted trade sanctions may produce unintended consequences, such as 
black markets and expanded opportunities for corruption. The beneficiaries 
of black markets and corruption may be the target itself (Wallensteen, 
Staibano, Eriksson, 2003, p.124).
As highlighted by the Stockholm Process, all these typical problems may be 
encountered when the sanction is targeted on diamonds. 
Additionally, diamonds are particularly lootable natural resources. Indeed, the 
diamond trade is difficult to control because of the gems' small size and the difficulty to 
determine their origin. Furthermore, their composition make them impossible to be 
detected by millimeter wave scanners in airports. 
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2.2.2 Effectiveness of UN sanctions targeted on diamonds
As we have seen in the introduction, the UN Security Council (UNSC) imposed several 
export bans on diamonds (Table 1). Le Billion and Nicholls conducted a quantitative 
study aiming at assessing the effectiveness of UN military interventions, revenue 
sharing initiatives and economic sanctions in the case of 'Resource Wars', i.e wars 
financed by natural resources, between 1989 and 2006 (Le Billion, Nicholls, 2007). 
They concluded that sanctions targeted on specific resources were successfully 
implemented only 57 per cent of the time, while military interventions were successful 
at 89 per cent and revenue sharings 83 per cent (Ibid., p.620). However, sanctions seem 
to have slightly better results when it comes to resolving conflicts (50 per cent), whereas 
military interventions brought durable peace only 47 per cent of the time. 
Table 1: UN sanctions on conflict diamonds
Countries Resolutions starting 
the sanctions
Aim of the resolution Resolutions ending 
the sanctions
Angola ES/1173 (1998)
RES/1237 (2000)
RES/1295 (2000)
On all diamonds outside governemental 
Certificate of Origin  regime and the 
provision of mining equipment and 
services to non government-controlled 
areas.
Establishment of expert panels.
Establishment of a sanctions monitoring 
mechanism.
RES/1448 (2002)
Côte d'Ivoire RES/1584 (2005)
RES/1643 (2005) 
Establishment of a group of experts. 
On all rough diamonds and re-
establishment of group of experts.
RES/2153 (2014)
Liberia RES/1343 (2001) On all rough diamonds, and 
establishment of an expert panel.
RES/1753 (2007)
Sierra Leone RES/1306 (2000) On all rough diamonds pending an 
effective governmental Certificate of 
Origin regime, and creation of expert 
panel on the implementation of 
sanctions.
RES/1492 (2003)
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The UNSC imposed sanctions against Angolan diamonds, because UNITA rebels 
exchanged them for weapons and sold them to pay their combattants. A report 
calculated that in 1999, despite the embargo imposed in 1998, UNITA collected 
approximately $3-4 million through the sale of conflict diamonds (Fowler, 2000).
Furthermore, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the sanctions did not stop the human rights 
abuses nor the illegal diamond trade (Haufler 2009). 
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3 The Kimberley Process in global 
    governance
3.1 The evolution of corporate ethics and the creation 
of the Kimberley Process
3.1.1 Corporate responsibility 
Already in the 1950s, Howard Bowen described a globalized society where only a 
hundred multinational corporations (MNC) were the vital centers of power that shaped 
the lives of the citizens. Bowen proposed a very innovative concept of the social 
responsibility of businesses: « it refers to the obligations of businessmen to pursue 
policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable 
in terms of the objectives and values of our society »(Carroll 1999, p.269).  
Throughout the second half of the 20th century, this idea developed, until the arrival of 
the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the late 1990s. MNCs began to 
be receptive to the NGO critics which pushed for them to being more ethical. The UN 
launched Global Compact in 1999 and in 2011 the United Nations Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights under the direction of Professor John Ruggie. As Slim 
notes, corporate social responsbility was based on the three 'P's : 'people, planet and 
profit', a model developed by the NGO innovator John Elkington (Slim 2012, p.909). 
14
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3.2.1 The creation of a new governance system 
As highlighted above, the UN sanctions targeted against diamonds in the late 1990s 
failed. The emerging global norms of corporate responsibility as well as the ideas of the 
international community's responsibility to protect civilians boosted the rapid creation 
of the KP (Haufler, 2009, p.407). Additionally, the campaign against conflict diamonds 
led by NGOs such as Amnesty International, Global Witness and Partnership Africa 
Canada threatened the whole diamond industry (Annex 1). By 2000, some industry 
leaders became aware of the fact that the mass public began to associate diamonds with 
violence, conflicts and human rights abuses, rather than with their mythical symbols of 
eternal love and commitment4. 
Moreover, the diamond industry being one of the most oldest and most successful 
cartels in history, is highly hierarchichal and organized. De Beers Group of Companies, 
founded by Cecil Rhodes in 1869, controlled the diamond market from the extraction to 
the distribution (Haufler, 2009, p.405). Indeed, in the 1990s, De Beers mined half the 
world's stones and controlled 80 per cent of the sales (The Economist, 2011). Because 
of the highly concentrated diamond industry, negotiations for the creation of the KP 
were easily reached. This also explains why the creation of the KP only took three years 
from start to finish (Haufler, 2009, p.407). 
In 2000, the South African diamond producing states, representatives of diamond 
industry and civil society organisations gathered in Kimberley, South Africa to discuss 
an action-plan to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the rough diamond market 
(KP 1). The same year, the United Nations adopted Resolution 1385, fostering the 
creation of an international scheme for rough diamonds and the World Federation of 
Diamond Bourses and the International Diamond Manufacturers Association jointly 
created the World Diamond Council (WDC) in order to develop a tracking system for 
trade in rough diamonds (Sethi, Emelianova, 2011, p.215). 
Finally, in 2003, the Kimberley Process entered into force gathering 40 member 
countries, the WDC and the two NGOs who singled out the conflict diamond issue – 
4 In an article published in Business Insider, Rohin Dhar explained how De Beers created diamonds' symbolic value 
of eternal love, in particular through their advertisements for engagement rings 
(http://www.businessinsider.com/why-diamonds-are-a-sham-2013-3?IR=T). 
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Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada – thus bringing together national 
governments, private sector players and NGOs to form a public-private partnership 
(Haufler, 2009, p.409).  
3.2 The implementation of the Kimberley Process 
3.2.1 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is a document consisting of a 
Preamble and six sections where the goals of the project, its governance-system 
deliberative bodies, organization and decision-making structures, responsibilities for 
monitoring performance and public disclosure are described (KP 2). 
   The first section of the KPCS contains the definitions of terms that are used in the 
certification system, starting with the definition of conflict diamonds:
 
«rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance 
conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments, as described in 
relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar 
as they remain in effect, or in other similar UNSC resolutions which 
may be adopted in the future, and as understood and recognised in 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in 
other similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in future»
(KP 2). 
It also defines the concepts of Participant («a state or a regional economic integration 
organisation for which the Certification Scheme is effective»), Observer («a 
representative of civil society, the diamond industry, international organisations and 
non-participating governments invited to take part in Plenary meetings»), Parcel («one 
or more diamonds that are packed together and that are not individualised»), Shipment 
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("one or more parcels that are physically imported or exported») and of the Kimberley 
Certificate which is «a forgery resistant document with a particular format which 
identifies a shipment of rough diamonds as being in compliance with the requirements 
of the Certification Scheme» (KP 2).
The second section sets out the principles governing the certificates. Each participant 
must indeed ensure that a certificate complying with the minimum requirements of the 
Kimberley Process accompanies each shipment of rough diamonds to be imported; in 
addition to the minimum requirements of the agreement, participants can add other 
elements to their certificates and inform the other participants.
The heart of the system is defined in the third section. Each participant should ensure 
that
(a) a Kimberley Process Certificate (hereafter referred to as the Certificate) 
accompanies each shipment of rough diamonds on export; 
(b) its processes for issuing Certificates meet the minimum standards of the 
Kimberley Process as set out in Section IV; 
(c) Certificates meet the minimum requirements set out in Annex I. As long 
as these requirements are met, Participants may at their discretion establish 
additional characteristics for their own Certificates, for example their form, 
additional data or security elements; 
(d) it notifies all other Participants through the Chair of the features of its 
Certificate as specified in Annex I, for purposes of validation. 
In other words, no trade of rough diamonds without certificate and no trade outside the 
circle of participants in the Kimberley Process, either import or export, is allowed.
The fourth section deals with the internal controls each participant is committed to 
implement, for instance the designation of an Importing and Exporting Authority. On 
the other hand, section five deals with the transparency issue, such as the commitment 
of each participant to share data regarding their diamond production.
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3.2.2 The design of the Kimberley Process
The official texts of the KP do not only contain principles, obligations or 
recommendations that participants must enforce: they also present the mechanisms, 
procedures and organs that control the operation of the system and organize dialogue 
among the participants. The organs consist of the Chair and the Secretariat of the 
plenary meetings, committees and specialized working groups.
The Chair oversees the implementation of the certification system, the proper 
functioning of the working groups and committees and the general administration of the 
KP. The Chair is appointed for one year by the Plenary among the participants. The 
Chair is also in charge of the Secretariat, whose task consists of organizing meetings, 
distributing documents to participants, and the website. However, only states can be 
appointed Chair and vote during Plenary meetings. Furthermore, Administrative 
Decisions are made by consensus, implying that a minority of participants can block a 
decision. Therefore, despite its tripartie structure, the KP is a state-dominated system 
(Cullen, 2013, p.62).
The Plenary Meeting, held annually, is open to the Participants, Observers and 
Applicants. A final release reporting the decisions and events of the meeting is 
published on the website of the KP. 
There are also four working groups: the Working Group of Diamond Experts 
(WGDE), the Working Group on Monitoring (WGM), the Working Group on Statistics 
(WGS) and the Working Group on Artisanal & Alluvial Production (WGAAP)5.
The WGM, chaired by the European Union, is a particularly important group, since it 
is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the process by the 
Participants. The WGS, chaired by the United States of America, is responsible for 
reports and analysis of statistical data on production and trade of rough diamonds in 
order to detect any anomaly and enable the effective application of the system 
certification. The WGDE, chaired by the WDC is responsible for identifying problems 
of a technical nature relating to the implementation of the Kimberley Process, such as 
5 The KP noted that « Working groups can be added according to the necessity of the work ». 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/working-groups-and-committees
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the proposed changes to the Harmonized System codes of the World Customs 
Organization; the classification of diamond powders; international diamond samples for 
exploration transfers. Finally, the WGAAP, chaired by Angola aims at promoting 
optimal effective internal controls on the production and trade of alluvial diamonds6. 
3.3 The role of the Kimberley Process in conflicts  
3.3.1 The Kimberley Process and Human Rights
The aim of the KP was and still is to halt the traffic of conflict diamonds, which are
directly linked to the fuelling of armed conflict, the activities of
rebel movements aimed at undermining or overthrowing legitimate 
governments, and the illicit traffic in, and proliferation of, armaments,
especially small arms and light weapons (KP 2).
As a report of the PAC recalls, « armed conflict is the ultimate thief of human rights » 
(Létourneau & Smilie, 2009, p.9). Therefore, the KP's main goal was to stop human 
rights abuses linked to diamond trade (Ibid.). Moreover, the KPCS recognizes the
devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds
on the peace, safety and security of people in affected countries and the 
systematic and gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated 
in such conflicts (KP 2). 
Thereby, the core document of the KP which presents the objectives of the scheme 
6 As noted by the KP, the creation of the WGAAP was necessary since more than 10 million diamantaires, miners and 
diggers worked in alluvial diamond mines. http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/artisanal-and-alluvial-wgaap-0
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presents the eradication of human rights abuses linked with the trade of diamonds as 
being one the primary objectives (Global Witness, 2010, p.19). 
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4 Empirical research
4.1 The conflict diamonds of the Marange Fields 
4.1.1 Background context to the conflict
From the early 1980s, De Beers held an Exclusive Prospecting Order (EPO) in parts 
of the Marange district, in the Eastern part of Zimbabwe, near the Mozambique border 
(See Annex 2). On March 28th 2006, the company's EPO and licence of exploration 
expired (Létourneau & Smilie, 2009, p.7). The British-registered Africa Consolidated 
Resources Ltd (ACR) received exploration rights (Shaik-Peremanov, 2014, p.336). In 
June 2006, the Marange diamond fields were discovered. These diamond mines are said 
to be the biggest diamond discovery of a generation7. In June 2006, ZANU-PF8 
authorities officially declared the Marange fields open and «free to anyone wishing to 
search for diamonds» (Human Rights Watch 2009, p.14). As a consequence, from July 
2006, a diamond rush started. 
In December 2006, ACR's licence was abrogated when then-minister of mines Amos 
Midzi granted exclusive mining and exploration of mines to the state-owned Zimbabwe 
Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) (Shaik-Peremanov 2014, p.336). The 
government justified this decision by claiming that they aimed at restoring order in 
Marange after the diamond rush (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p.13).
However, the government take-over accelerated the diamond rush. By mid-
December 2006, around 15,000-20,000 illegal artisanal miners were working at 
Marange. Food, water, shelter and sanitation crises were developing  (Létourneau & 
7 Minister of Mines Obert Mpofu estimates that Marange represents 25 percent of the world’s global rough diamond 
production. Source: “Inside the Marange Diamond Fields”, CNN documentary, March 16, 2012 
8 The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) led by President President Robert Mugabe is 
the ruling party in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980.
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Smilie, 2009, p.7). 
From early 2007, miners had to work in syndicates under the control of the police. 
Civilians who were found to dig independently9 from a syndicate were beaten, raped or 
killed10. The violence reached a peak in October and November 2008 during the 
Operation 'Hakudzowki' or 'No Return', perpetuated by the army. More than 800 
soldiers in helicopters encircled the Marange fields and shot over 200 miners (Global 
Witness, 2010, p.6). The army then took control of the mines, took over the police's role 
by forcing people to search for diamonds for them and continued to perpetrate human 
rights abuses. 
Human rights abuses were also accompanied by severe corruption. The unlicensed 
miners sold the diamonds directly to the police controlling the diamond mines. 
However, not a single dollar went to the Zimbabwean Treasury. PAC wrote a report 
denouncing the fact that the revenues of diamond sales went directly to elected 
members of the government, senior officials of ZANU-PF and their spouses (PAC, 
2012, p.17-26). GW also reported that the ZMDC admitted that the company had not 
paid any dividend to the Zimbabwean state for over twenty years. This is problematic 
given that this state-owned company was the only body charged with the exploitation of 
the Marange (GW, 2010, p.12). 
Because of Zimbabwe's economic cirucmstances, the government began to fail to 
buy the diamonds from the miners. As a consequence, an important black market 
developed (Létourneau & Smilie, 2009, p.3). The geographical situation of the Marange 
Fields rendered smuggling very easy. Mutare, the closest city to the Marange Fields is 
only a few kilometers away from the Mozambique border. On the Mozambican side, the 
streets of Manica, a border city, was full of diamond dealers who offered higher prices 
for the diamonds than the government (PAC, 2012, p.12). 
To conclude, as PAC noted, the Marange diamond fields' potential was ruined by 
smuggling, violence and corruption (PAC, 2012, p.1). PAC even qualified the Marange 
Field theft as « the biggest single plunder of diamonds since Cecil Rhodes » (Ibid.). 
9 People digging outside syndicates are called 'Snipers' (Martin, Taylor, 2010, p.20). 
10 For detailed information on human rights abuses perpetuated by the police in the Marange fields before the sanction 
was imposed in 2009, see Human Rights Watch, 2009. 
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4.2.2 The KP sanction against conflict diamonds of the Marange Fields
In 2008, NGO investigations denouncing the situation in the Marange Fields were not 
taken into consideration by the KP participants. Indeed, some governments responded 
by saying that the situation in the Marange Fields did not violate KP standards because 
Marange diamonds did not contradict the UN's definition of 'blood diamonds' used by 
the KP,  which is, for the record, diamonds «used by rebel movements to finance their 
military activities, including attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate 
governments». Therefore, using this definition, the KP did not consider that 
governments perpetuating human rights abuses on illegal diamond miners should be 
punished. This narrow definition even led then-KP Chair Bernard Easau to state that 
« the Kimberley Process is not a humanitarian organisation » (Global Witness, 2010, 
p.9). However, as we have seen above, the protection of human rights is at the heart of 
the KP's goals. 
 The WGM sent a review mission to Marange from June 30th to July 4th 2009 and 
concluded that Zimbabwe was effectively in non-compliance with the minimum 
requirements of the KP. They noted human rights abuses, armed soldiers managing 
syndicates of miners, as well as important smuggling operations (KP 13). The team 
recommended that the country should be suspended from the KP for at least six months 
(Ibid.).
When KP Participants and Observers met from November 2nd to 5th 2009, in 
Swakopmund, Namibia for the annual Plenary Meeting, the situation in Zimbabwe was 
at the heart of the discussions. Observer NGOs called for Zimbabwe's expulsion and had 
gathered 150,000 signatures for a petition asking the expulsion of Zimbabwe11. 
However, the KP did not expell Zimbabwe but imposed an export ban on Marange 
diamonds and agreed for a Joint Work Plan (JWP) developed by Zimbabwe aiming at 
bringing back Zimbabwe in compliance with the KP standards (KP 3, 2009). The 
objectives of this Administrative Decision (AD) were to 
11 Ban Zimbabwe Blood Diamonds, petition accessible at http://www.avaaz.org/en/diamonds_for_love_not_hate/, 
retrieved on December 13th 2014.
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provide security and strengthen internal controls, curb illegal digging, 
regulate alluvial mining according to best practices (KP 2). 
The WGM specified that the JWP consists in 
providing a supervised export mechanism under which exports of
Marange diamonds are subject to prior KP verification and 
confirmation (KP 2).
This JWP was to be supported by KP technical assistance and the KP included the 
appointment of a KP Monitor for the Marange Fields, whose task was to 
(1) Monitor and inform the Kimberley Process, and liaise with the 
Zimbabwean Ministry of Mines, about implementation of the Joint 
Work Plan; 
(2) Represent the Kimberley Process, with regard to the supervised
 export mechanism for Marange diamonds (KP 2).
As noted by GW, the JWP did not address all the issues with which Zimbabwe was non-
compliant, and failed to mention human rights (Global Witness, 2010, p.10). KP official 
documents are indeed vague when it comes to identifying political objectives. However, 
the AD refers to the WGM Review Mission of June 2009, by recalling that the WGM 
found 
“credible indications of significant non-compliance” by Zimbabwe 
with the minimum requirements of the KPCS (KP 3).
Although KP official texts are vaguely worded, the AD on Zimbabwe refers to the 
WGM Review Mission Report which, as we have seen, identified many violations of 
KP standards in the Marange Fields. We can therefore assess that the objectives of the 
sanction were to:
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■ improve the human rights situation in the Marange Fields
■ end smuggling 
■ end corruption 
4.2 The conflict diamonds of the Central African 
Republic
4.2.1 Background context to the conflict
The CAR may be the perfect example of what is ironically a 'gemocracy'12. Indeed,  
since its independence from France in 1960, the diamond sector in the CAR has always 
been corrupt, marked by massive fraud and opacity. From the bloodthirsty regime of 
"Emperor" Bokassa (1966 -1979) to the one of President François Bozizé (2003-2013), 
only a small elite of politicians and businessmen linked to diamantaires received juicy 
profits from the diamond trade. However, while the elite benefitted from this blessing, 
the population suffered. Indeed, the CAR is ranked 180 out of 187 countries in the 2012 
United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index (Malpeli & 
Chirico 2014, p.250). Therefore, the political crisis of the CAR led to a humanitarian 
crisis. 
Recently, the situation took a turn for the worse. Since December 10th  2012, the 
country is torn by a civil war, known as the Central African Republic Conflict. In 
September 2012, political parties and rebel groups opposed to the regime of François 
Bozizé, gathered and formed a rebel group known as the Séléka-CPSK-CPJP-UFDR or 
'Séléka' (Malpeli & Chirico, 2014, p.249). The Convention of Patriots for Justice and 
12 In Les gemmocraties : l'économie politique du diamant africains, François Misser an Olivier Vallée describe how 
many African states base the major part of their economy on gems. 
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Peace (CPJP), the Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK), the Union of 
Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), the Democratic Front of the Central African 
People (FDPC) and the Alliance pour la Renaissance et la Refondation (A2R) were 
united under the leadership of Michel Djotodia. The Séléka was a mainly-Muslim group 
in a country composed of 80 per cent of Christians. 
The hostilities began when the Séléka seized several major cities in the northern, 
central and eastern part of the country. On March 24th 2013, the Séléka coalition seized 
the Presidential Palace while Bozizé was escaping to Benin. Michel Djotodia 
proclaimed himself president of the CAR.
After the escape of Bozizé, elements of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), 
territories rich in diamond were exploited by the Séléka. The ICG qualifies the Séléka's 
expansion as 'rapid' and 'strategic' (ICG, 2013, p.10). Indeed, the rebels targeted the 
West of the country, where the biggest diamond deposit of the country is found. 
Consequently, miners and villagers tried to resist in Garga and Gadzi, which ended 
almost systematically in bloody clashes. This triggered many Central Africans to join 
the anti-balaka, the rebel group mainly composed of Christians, opposed to the Séléka 
(Ibid.).
4.2.2 KP sanction against the Central African Republic
On December 28th 2012, after the Séléka took control of several diamond-producing 
areas including Bria, Sam Ouandja and Bamingui, the KP Chair published a note asking 
all participants and observers to be «vigilant» concerning 
the possible illicit introduction of rough diamonds into the supply 
chain by Seleka or its allies (KP 6, 2012). 
In order to enhance vigilance measures, a footprint of the diamond production from the 
Eastern region around Bria, giving the characteristics of the diamonds from this region, 
was prepared by the WGDE and was attached to the vigilance note (KP 7). In addition,  
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 a map of the situation in the CAR highlighting the different diamond deposits, the rebel 
movements and the geomorphic landform units was published (KP 8). 
One year later, on April 18th 2013, the KP Chair released a similar vigilance note 
about the deteriorating situation in the CAR (KP 9). Once again, the note asked the 
diamond industry and participating governments to remain vigilant regarding the 
activities of the rebel groups. It added that the 
KP would request the Working Group on Monitoring to organize
a team of experts for a review mission and provide the KP authorities
from the CAR and the KP Chair with recommendations for possible 
further steps to be taken (Ibid.).
Noting that the situation in the CAR was not improving, the KP proposed the expulsion 
of the CAR from the scheme. The deadline for the submission of the votes was May 10th
2013. The requirements for approval by written procedure were met through the support 
of 19 participants, including the EU and the USA (KP 10, 2013). Thereby, the 
Administrative Decision announcing the temporary suspension of the CAR was 
published on May 23rd 2013 (KP 11, 2013). It noted that 
the Decision and the situation in the CAR are to be reviewed by 
the Working Group on Monitoring, in consultation with other 
working bodies, at the Intersessional meeting of the KPCS taking
place in Kimberley, South Africa, from 4-7 June 2013 (KP 11). 
Similarly to the AD concerning the embargo on diamonds from the Marange Fields,  the 
AD initiating the suspension is vague. However, based on the NGOs' and the WGM's 
reports, the objectives of the AD with regard to the situation in the CAR consist in:
■ stopping forced labor 
■ ending smuggling 
■ ending corruption 
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5 Theoretical analysis
5.1 Effectiveness of the export ban on Marange diamonds
5.1.1   Primary objectives
Four months after the AD on the Marange Fields, in March 2010, the appointed KP-
Monitor for Marange Abbey Chikane was sent for a review mission in Marange in order 
to inspect whether the JWP was in progress. He concluded that Zimbabwe should be 
allowed to sell its diamonds from the Marange Fields because he judged that the 
situation met the minimum requirements (KP 14).
In June 2010, the KP sent a second review mission which judged that Zimbabwe 
violated the the minimum requirements, and therefore maintained the embargo. 
In 2011 the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the KP Chair. In March 2011, 
the DRC pushed for the lift of the embargo on Marange diamonds. At the Plenary 
Meeting in Kinshasa from October 31st to November 3rd, the participants endorsed the 
proposition of the DRC, and the Administrative Decision lifting the embargo was 
published (KP 5). This turnaround shocked the CSOs, and even led Global Witness to 
leave the KP one month after this decision. In a message announcing Global Witness' 
departure, founding director Charmian Gooch declared that 
the decision to endorse unlimited diamond exports from named 
companies in the Marange region of Zimbabwe - the scene of mass
 killings by the national army - has turned an international conflict
 prevention mechanism into a cynical corporate accreditation scheme 
 (Global Witness, 2011).
28
Lund University     STVK02
Department of Political Science                     HT14         
          Tutor: Anders Uhlin
5.1.2      Enforcement of the sanction
In spite of the export ban on diamonds from the Marange Fields, diamonds were found 
on the market between Novembe 2009 and November 2011. As noted by PAC, South 
Africa was the principal gateway for smugglers (PAC, 2012, p.12). However, large 
quantities of Marange diamonds have also been found in the DRC (Ibid.). Moreover, 
according to Global Witness, Zimbabwe exported shipments of diamonds from Marange 
to the United Arab Emirates (GW, 2010, p.10). Indeed, according to a reportage from 
Dhadija Sharife and John Grobler, Marange diamonds were smuggled out of Zimbabwe 
to DRC, which sent them to the tax haven of Dubai. In the Dubai Diamond Exchange, 
'clean' diamonds are mixed with conflict diamonds and then sent to Antwerp  with a 
KPC from the United Arab Emirates (Sharife & Grobler, 2013, p.69). 
5.2   Effectiveness of the export ban on Central African 
diamonds
5.2.1    Primary objectives
The intersessional meeting in Shanghai from 9th to 12th June 2014 devoted a special 
attention to the situation of the CAR (KP 12, 2014). The KP acknowledged that despite 
the CAR suspension, Central African diamonds had been found on the international 
market of rough diamonds. Therefore, the export ban was maintained. 
The deteriorating political situation of the CAR led France to launch a military 
intervention on December 5th 2013, known as the Operation Sangaris, the 7th French 
military intervention in the country since its independence in 1960. Four months later, 
on April 10th 2014, the UN send the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilizations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), a peacekeeping 
mission mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
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5.2.2    Enforcement of the sanction
Despite the export ban, diamonds from the CAR were found on the international market 
after May 2013. Indeed, according to the ICG, the activity has slowed down but 
smugglers seem to have found a way to get around the embargo (ICG, 2014, p.11)
The ICG revealed how smugglers passed by Cameroon, member of the KP since 2012, 
and Sudan which is not a participant of the KP. The Cameroonian route for smuggling 
existed before the embargo was imposed – Central Africans sold their diamonds to 
Cameroonian gems dealers on the other side of the border. However, the ICG noted that 
the smuggling through Cameroon was particularly controlled by the KP which was 
alerted and now conducts investigations whenever diamonds from suspect origin are 
caught. While diamond smuggling diminished in Cameroon, according to the ICG, more 
and more diamonds are smuggled out of the country via the North, through Sudan (Ibid, 
p.13). 
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6 Conclusions
6.1 Results 
In this study, I have focused on the following question: How effective are the sanctions 
targeted on diamonds from the Marange fields and the CAR imposed by the Kimberley 
Process? I thus focused on two KP participants whose political situation put their 
membership at stake. 
In Zimbabwe, the dictatorial regime of President Robert Mugabe inflicted severe 
human rights abuses on illegal miners from the Marange Fields. Furthermore, the whole 
diamond industry of the Marange Fields was corrupt, since the income generated by the 
diamond trade never reached in the Zimbabwean Treasury but rather went to senior 
members of Mugabe's governement. In addition, diamonds from the Marange Fields 
were smuggled out of the country without any KPC, thus delegitimizing the whole 
KPCS. Therefore, ending human rights abuses, corruption and smuggling were the three 
primary objectives of the KP sanction targeted on conflict diamonds from the Marange 
Fields imposed in November 2009. However, two years after the imposition of the 
sanction, the KP lifted the sanction even though no clear improvements of the situation 
had been made. Indeed, as we have seen, smuggling was still ongoing, human rights 
abuses were still perpetrated and corruption still present. 
 On the other hand, the situation in the CAR was very similar to that of the resource 
wars of the 1990s, such as in Sierra Leone and Angola. Indeed, rebels took control of 
the alluvial diamond-producing areas of the country and forced people to search for 
diamonds for them. Therefore, the conflict did not pose any definitional debate unlike 
the situation in the Marange Fields. 
One year and a half after the imposition of the sanction in May 2013, the Central 
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African Republic conflict is still ongoing. Moreover, both the Séléka group and the anti-
balaka control the diamond-producing areas and use the diamonds to finance their 
activities. France sent a military intervention, followed by a UN peacekeeping mission, 
as a consequence of the deteriorating political situation in the CAR. Indeed, both the 
anti-balaka and the Séléka have the control of the majority of the diamond-producing 
areas in the East near Bria and in the West of the country. 
The major enforcement issue of the KP sanctions is therefore diamond evasion, 
through smuggling. The major problem is that, except for the CAR's diamond evasion 
through Sudan and the Marange Fields diamonds via Mozambique, most of the 
smuggling takes place inside the legal KP system (PAC, 2012, p.12). As the report on 
the Dubai Diamond Exchange has shown, most of the smuggled Marange diamonds 
were found on the international market thanks to this subsidiary company, mixing 'clean' 
gems with conflict diamonds (Sharife & Grober 2013). 
According to my findings, the targeted sanctions against conflict diamonds from the 
Marange Fields have failed both on the first level of analysis, i.e. the political objectives 
and on the second level of analysis, regarding the enforcement of the sanction. 
In a similar way, the sanction against the conflict diamonds from the CAR failed on 
both levels.
6.2 Discussion
Targeted sanctions are more difficult to administer than comprehensive sanctions. They 
are indeed more complex and more difficult to implement and demand a certain amount 
of political will. By analyzing the Administrative Decisions officializing the sanctions 
against the conflict diamonds from the CAR and the Marange Fields, we have seen that 
all official KP texts are very vague when it comes to identifying the objectives of the 
sanctions. Moreover, they never mention human rights abuses, which are the core of the 
conflict diamond issues. Human rights are indeed mentioned in the KPCS Preamble, but 
the lack of clarity of the KPCS Preamble regarding its task vis-à-vis human rights has 
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led some governments to state that the KP was not a humanitarian organisation and was 
therefore not compelled to sanction Zimbabwe. Indeed, the Marange Fields was an 
unprecedented case for the KP since the perpetrators of human rights abuses linked to 
diamonds were not rebels but the government itself. 
CSOs such as GW have requested the KP to include the protection of human rights. 
At the Plenary Meeting taking place in Johannesburg from November 19th to 22nd 2013, 
the South African state opened the Assembly by claiming that the Kimberley Process 
was not intended to stop the abuse of human rights (RFI, 2013). In an interview,  
Director of Southern Africa Resource Watch (SARW) Claude Kabemba argues that the 
diamond-producing countries, especially with the recent case of Zimbabwe, fear that 
Western countries want to use human rights as an excuse to overthrow regimes that they 
do not trust. Therefore, like South Africa, several African diamond-producing countries 
argue that it would be dangerous to include human rights in the KP since human rights 
are not clearly defined (RFI, 2013). Therefore, as the case of Zimbabwe has shown, the 
KP seems to be an inappropriate body for resolving crises in dictatorial regimes. 
In economic sanction theory, scholars have made the distinction between expressive 
and instrumental purposes of sanctions. Galtung classified sanctions into two categories 
expressive and instrumental. An instrumental sanction is a sanction aimed at influencing 
the receiving country, while an expressive sanction is a symbolic instrument, aiming at 
signaling or expressing internal tensions (Baldwin, 1985, p.97). It is diffucult to assess 
whether the KP sanctions targeted on the Marange Fields and Zimbabwe were 
instrumental or expressive. Indeed, in both cases, efforts were made to improve the 
situation through the different working groups, such as the Working Group on 
Monitoring. 
However, regarding the two goals of the KP targeted sanctions, namely coercion and 
signaling, I would say that in the case of the CAR, the sanction did not fulfill its 
coercive purpose since the illegal traffic of diamonds is still ongoing today and the 
government has still no control over the diamond exploitation. The UN resolved the 
conflict by sending the UN peacekeeping MINUSCA operation. However, the sanction 
sent a clear signal and was coherently monitored, since the KP maintains the embargo.
In the case of Zimbabwe, the signal to the government was blurry; indeed, the lifting of 
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the embargo without any clear improvement of the situation was unexpected.
My hypothesis turned out to be wrong; the tripartite structure of the KP did not 
particularly enhance the effectiveness of the sanctions. The KP is almost predominantly 
state-controlled, since only states are allowed to be KP Chair and to vote in Plenary 
Meetings. Moreover, Administrative Decisions are made by consensus, which means 
that a minority of participants can block a proposed decision. This structure exasperated 
in particular Global Witness, who decided to leave the KP after the Zimbabwe case. 
Nevertheless, we cannot blame the KP for everything. We have to keep mind that the 
diamond is one of the most lootable natural resources in particular because of its small 
size and the difficulty of assessing its origin. Moreover, as we have seen in Le Billion's 
and Nicholls' study on the effectiveness of military interventions, revenue sharings and 
economic sanctions in resource wars, economic sanctions have only one chance in to 
two of being successfully implemented. Therefore, the problem may also arise from the 
targeted sanctions themselves. For further research, it would be interesting to turn the 
question the other way around, and question the relevance of commodity sanctions in 
the situation of a conflict linked with diamonds. 
To conclude, I would say that through my case studies on the conflict diamonds of 
the Marange Fields and from the Central African Republic, we can see that the 
Kimberley Process has neither had the capacity nor the ability to resolve the conflicts 
autonomously.
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Annex 1 : Amnesty International France poster 
 for the conflict diamond campaign
                                  « What price for these diamonds? » 
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Annex 2:  Location of the Main Diamond Producing 
 Sites in Zimbabwe
Source: Létourneau, J., Smilie, I., 2009
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